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Conspiracy, Security, and Human Care in 
Donnersmarck’s Leben der Anderen 
John T. Hamilton ∗ 
Abstract: »Verschwörung, Sicherheit und menschliche Sorge in Donnersmarcks 
Leben der Anderen«. Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck’s acclaimed film, Das 
Leben der Anderen (2006), affords a provocative opportunity for investigating 
the relation between conspiracy and security. Although state-sponsored con-
spiracies breed insecurity among the citizenry, they nonetheless also provide 
the ground for epistemological security, insofar as the threat can be decisively 
located. In pressing the literal definition of security as “the removal of con-
cern,” this article interprets the film according to shifting modalities of care. 
Considered as a vast conspiratorial network against its own populace, the East 
German Ministry for State Security (the Stasi) represents a mechanized, dispas-
sionate ideal that strives to eliminate concerns about whatever may jeopardize 
the regime. To counter this security project, Donnersmarck presents us with 
characters who display a fundamentally human care that is instigated by gov-
ernmental practices and yet ultimately works against state-oriented securitiza-
tion and legitimation. 
Keywords: conspiracy theory, security theory, the ethics of care, Stasi, East 
Germany’s Ministry of State Security. 
1.  Conspiracy and Security 
Conspiracies have always been the source of both insecurity and security. On 
the one hand, as countless cases of victims from across history would attest, 
plots designed and executed by conspiring groups have been responsible for 
robbing individuals of their psychological, social, economic, political and, 
ultimately, existential security. Indeed, to be the target of true conspiratorial 
machinations generally portends the gravest consequences. Certitude, assur-
ance, and confidence – components of a general understanding of security – 
quickly fall apart, leaving the casualty, if he or she should survive, without any 
ground on which to stand. Anyone may be involved; no one is to be trusted. On 
the other hand, for survivors at any rate, the discovery that a conspiracy does in 
fact exist affords a certain epistemological security. The presence of domineer-
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ing agents who steer events from behind the scenes, the network of invisible or 
inaccessible forces which influence the manifest course of our political and 
social lives, the chain of motives which point to a single, master intention – all 
bespeak an explanatory power that transmutes contingency into necessity, 
arbitrariness into rationality, objectless angst into identifiable fear. Meaningless 
violence is thereby granted meaning, however sinister. In brief, the possibility 
of a conspiracy redeems experience from pure absurdity. It permits those so 
inclined to peer beneath the surface of things, to arrive at some originating 
point, which can settle what would otherwise persist under frustrating igno-
rance. Those affected may see their lives rendered utterly insecure, but the 
establishment of a specific cause for their suffering or the suffering of others 
brings with it at the very least a securing rationale, an ability to locate the 
threat.  
These sense-making effects may account for the popularity of conspiracy 
theories in many of today’s cultures, including the most far-fetched and bizarre. 
After centuries of secularization have left us without recourse to ideas of fate or 
divine predestination, after historicism and moral relativism have falsified all 
teleological conceptions, after post-modernism has demolished once and for all 
the validity of our grands récits, we are faced with an explicatory vacuum that 
remains to be filled. A conspiracy implies that disparate events are actually 
connected, that random occurrences are not random at all but rather conscious-
ly orchestrated. Brian Keeley thus argues: “Conspiracy theorists are […] some 
of the last believers in an ordered universe. By supposing that current events 
are under the control of nefarious agents, conspiracy theories entail that such 
events are capable of being controlled” (Keeley 1999, 124, emphasis in text). 
The point is valid for wildly imagined as well as for brutally verifiable conspir-
acies: Attaching subjective agency to evil occurrences works to clarify motives 
and intentions, which afford a systematic, causal account that dispels the possi-
bility of mere chance. Thus, and perhaps most importantly, insofar as they 
involve human actors, conspiracies – however malicious, damaging, and fatal – 
invariably humanize the world. Instead of discounting catastrophes as the work 
of indifferent nature or inscrutable “acts of God,” misfortune can be attributed 
to real or presumably real human authors. Moreover, this immanent, human 
aspect recalls human limitations. The powers that control our experiences are 
not absolute. However improbable in most cases, conspirators qua human 
allow at least some room for negotiation. Men are neither machines nor gods. 
The very fact that conspirators must act secretly reminds us that they are not 
omnipotent.1  
The finite, human quality of conspiratorial organizations may serve as a fur-
ther link between ideas of conspiracy and security. What makes this link ex-
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plicit, I argue, is the “care” or “concern” – the Latin cura – that inheres in the 
term securitas. Following the term’s etymology, securitas aims to place “con-
cern or anxiety” (cura) off to the side (se-). Focused on the imminent future, 
cura consists in the intentionality that operates within human consciousness. 
Conspirators, no less than victims of conspiracy, express concerns that moti-
vate the actions and thoughts that work to put those concerns to rest. Generally 
speaking, insecurity persists when all manners of concern (anxiety, fear, dan-
ger) linger; and security results when these areas of concern are brought under 
control. Conspiratorial plots and the theories that potential targets devote to 
disclosing them both strive for this control, for an ordering that would turn the 
imminent future into a matter of no concern. In this sense, the various security 
problems that emerge in connection with conspiracies hardly differ from secu-
rity problems tout court.2 Such problems are based on the limitations humans 
must weigh in order to “take care” of anything.  
For this reason, security initiatives frequently depend on a variety of trans-
individual mechanisms, from governmental institutions to technological 
equipment. This dependence can be understood as motivated by a desire to 
transcend human finitude. Accordingly, security projects aim to remove us 
from concern by positioning multiple agents, organizations, or devices to be 
concerned in our stead. Sovereign bodies, which occupy a privileged place 
above the populace, can arguably foresee and identify threats better than others. 
The structure that defines this relation between the securing agents and those 
secured differs little from that which allows gadgets, devices, and sensors to 
catch what human senses might miss. In both cases, individual care is relegated 
to persons or machines that are designed, technologically or ideologically, for 
accuracy, promising others a life that would be literally carefree.  
To this end, the secured subject relinquishes the responsibility of self-care 
by submitting to a higher authority, by obeying the will of a collective, or simp-
ly by trusting technology. This act of submission, which belongs to the broader 
system of trade-offs historically linked to security programs – for example, an 
individual’s willingness to surrender certain human rights for greater safety – 
paves the way for abuse. It is not simply a horrific irony that within totalitarian-
minded regimes of the twentieth century bureaus explicitly founded to provide 
security have done so by instilling widespread insecurity among the populace: 
for example, the Soviet KGB (Комитет государственной безопасности, 
“Committee for State Security”), the Securitate police of communist Romania, 
and the notorious East German Stasi (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, “Minis-
try for State Security”). Nor can the tactics of these infamously abusive organs 
of the State be restricted to the darker moments of recent history. They are 
arguably always potentially at the ready wherever power is exercised over a 
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HSR 38 (2013) 1  │  132 
population. As Marc Crépon argues, state apparatuses are explicitly charged 
with inspiring fear so as to maintain the need for security. By exposing the 
people to a permanent menace, to perpetual insecurity, such organizations 
legitimize their existence (Crépon 2008, 49). However, one could further inter-
pret the path to abuse according to shifts of concern. What appears to be an 
abuse of power or flagrant legitimization is, at least on one level, the conver-
sion from the care for the individual to the care for the state (cf. Kleinschmidt 
2010, 9-23).  
Such techniques of securitization are dehumanizing when their concerns fall 
completely beyond the human. The greater irony, then, is that by instilling 
insecurity among the citizenry, by depriving its subjects of the privation of 
concern, agencies like the Stasi also allow their human subjects to continue to 
care, to remain human. Fear and anxiety – two perfectly adequate translations 
for cura – persist despite but also precisely because of totalitarian security 
measures. Moreover, overwhelmed by their own human finitude, which is the 
base cause of their insecurity (understood as an incapacity to deal definitively 
with their concerns), individuals targeted by governmental conspiracies may be 
impelled to form conspiracies of their own.  
2.  Human Care and the Security Machine 
The dynamics between security, conspiracy, and human care comes to the fore 
in Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck’s internationally acclaimed film Das 
Leben der Anderen (The Lives of Others, 2006), which unfolds a blatantly 
humanist tale beneath the dark and extensive shadow cast by the Stasi over the 
citizens of East Germany’s socialist state. Although the film has been criticized 
for its negligence of historical accuracy, it should not be faulted for presenting 
the Ministry for State Security as a vast conspiratorial network.3 Catherine 
Epstein provides a concise and telling account of what the organization in-
volved: 
One hundred seventy-eight kilometers of archival material. Personal files on 
six million individuals. Forty million index cards. One million pictures and 
negatives. Thousands of human scents stored in glass jars. 91,015 full-time 
employees. 174,000 ‘unofficial’ informants. The highest surveillance rate 
(agents to population) in history. Husbands spying on wives. Colleagues 
snitching on co-workers. Informants posing as dissidents. State officials har-
boring Red Army Faction terrorists. “Romeo” agents preying on hapless sec-
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analysis presented in a significant body of work on the Ministry for State Security, including 
Gieseke’s own work in Gieseke (2000) and (2001).  
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retaries. Commandos kidnapping alleged traitors from West Germany. Agent 
provocateurs infiltrating literary groups and church circles (Epstein 2004, 
322).  
Administration of this magnitude betrays a desire for comprehensiveness, an 
indefatigable ambition to encompass an entire population within the kind of 
tight order that is the hallmark of conspiratorial networks. The unprecedented 
scale of this generously funded ministry clearly aimed to keep each individual 
under watch like a nightmarish shepherd who never lets a single sheep wander 
from his gaze. Yet, whereas the ecclesiastical tradition of pastoral care worked 
toward the security of the flock – toward removing the concern of wolfish peril 
– here, the Stasi, as its name underscores, strove exclusively for the security of 
the state (Staatssicherheit), assiduously working to eliminate the threat of sub-
versive individuals.4 Despite their propagandistic claim to shield the populace 
from the fatal seductions of capitalism, in practice these ministers hoped to 
protect the state from the lure of individual difference. Consequently, in por-
traying the West as a site of greed, exploitation and violence, it intensified what 
was only implicit in the classic Plautine-Hobbesian warning: homo homini 
lupus (“man is a wolf to man”), which should now read homo civitati lupus 
(“man is a wolf to the state”).5 The Stasi’s astounding quantities of human 
resources therefore represented a will to transcend the human, to transform 
each individual into an efficacious cog in the state machine.  
Donnersmarck’s film persistently demonstrates how trans-individual, trans-
human security procedures carried out in the name of the state are undermined 
when human concerns or insecurities come into consideration. A nearly Mani-
chaean dualism pervades the plot: human care versus the mechanistic removal 
of care. The story centers on Gerd Wiesler (Ulrich Mühe), an interrogations 
expert, committed socialist and frighteningly effective Stasi officer. He has 
been assigned by his superior to monitor the day-to-day life of the renowned 
playwright Georg Dreyman (Sebastian Koch); and he initially performs this 
task with his usual discipline and clinically applied methods. At the film’s 
beginning we observe Wiesler as little more than a piece of some grand ma-
chine, a ruthless analyst with a keen sense for mendacity and prevarication, an 
efficient, self-effacing master of wiretapping, surveillance, and enhanced ob-
servation. Expressionless, Wiesler sits absolutely still, a paradigm of patience, 
attention, and vigilance, living up to his weasel name. Equipped with head-
phones and a characterless sports jacket buttoned to the neck, this balding man 
almost perfectly blends into the cold, drab grey of the radio transmitters that 
                                                             
4  In alluding to “pastoral care,” I am referring particularly to Michel Foucault’s genealogy of 
“governmentality” in Foucault (2007).  
5  The famous phrase is from Plautus, Asinaria, 495, and was cited by Thomas Hobbes in his 
dedication to De Cive: “Epistle Dedicatory to the Right Honourable William Earl of Devon-
shire,” in Hobbes (1998, 3-4).  
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surround him. The flesh of the face, although somewhat ashen, provides the 
only hint of living color. The technological gear, which replicates Wiesler’s 
motionlessness, further compromises this already diminished depiction of the 
human subject. The electronic components – the sound meters, the knobs, the 
switches and faders – seem to have transformed the figure into yet another 
instrument of technology, as if the human form were but a prosthetic extension 
of the system. This technologization of the human is underscored by the bu-
reaucratic, numerical moniker – HGW XX/7 – that chillingly supplants Wies-
ler’s proper name. Especially when compared to those under surveillance, 
HGW XX/7 is an inhuman utensil, completely divorced from human communi-
ty. 
The chiaroscuro of the film’s original poster emphasizes this point. Engulfed 
in darkness and shadow, Wiesler’s personhood fails to receive the light that 
illuminates Dreyman and his girlfriend Christa-Maria Sieland (Martina Ge-
deck). The armor of Wiesler’s tightly buttoned jacket contrasts with the opened 
shirt collar of his victim wrapped in amorous embrace. HGW’s red fingerprint 
demonstrates how the agent is nothing outside the system that has inscribed 
him. Life – human life – belongs to others. As Eva Horn comments, “HGW’s 
loneliness, the fact that he, unlike his victims, has no life, reduces him to a 
mere listening device, sitting in the attic of the house at his listening post with 
headphones. He is a medium – and nothing but a medium” (Horn 2008, 140). 
Yet, while Wiesler listens to what is taking place in Dreyman’s apartment, we 
the viewers are of course also observing Wiesler. HGW may be a mere medium 
for the state’s security initiatives, but for us he is a man who has been or is still 
in the process of being medialized. The portrayal decisively complicates our 
anxiety about invasive security methods by turning to the fragile individuality 
of the security officer himself. The mechanizing, dehumanizing effects visible 
in the shot signal a loss that the film diligently strives to restitute. Throughout, 
the oscillating focus from the victimized object of surveillance to the dehuman-
ized agent illustrates how security projects potentially entail deprivations for all 
involved, how both the object and subject of security stand to lose something 
vital.  
Machines are designed to operate indifferently, without any feelings, which 
– among human beings – tend to compromise the task at hand. As an officer of 
state security, Wiesler must suppress any such emotional disturbance. It is 
noteworthy that the history of the term securitas points to an analogous logic of 
suppression. In De officiis Cicero submits the following definition:  
Vacandum autem omni est animi perturbatione, cum cupiditate et metu, tum 
etiam aegritudine et voluptate animi et iracundia, ut tranquillitas animi et se-
curitas adsit, quae affert cum constantiam, tum etiam dignitatem. (Off. 1.69) 
There must be freedom from every disturbance of the mind, not only rom de-
sire and fear but also from distress, from the mind’s pleasure and anger, so 
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that there may be present the tranquility of the mind and the security which 
brings not only constancy but also dignity.  
Mindful of the etymological motivation of the word securitas, the list of trou-
bling emotions – “desire, fear, distress, pleasure and anger” – should be regard-
ed as the curae that threaten to agitate the mind and thereby rob it of its inner 
stability and integrity.6 As a mental condition resulting from elimination, Cice-
ro’s securitas comes to characterize the “blessed life” (beata vita) lauded by 
Hellenistic philosophers. Accordingly, the Latin negating prefix (se-) corre-
sponds to the Greek alpha-privative that distinguishes well-known ideals like 
Stoic apatheia (“the negation of disturbing emotions or pathē) and Epicurean 
ataraxia (“the negation of anything that aims to trouble [tarassein] the soul”). 
Historically, Cicero, like most of the Roman Stoics, link the calm state of secu-
ritas with a decisive withdrawal from the political forum, which is invariably 
depicted as a hotbed of overwhelming concerns (curae) and disruptive passions 
(pathē). By contrast, in the twentieth-century context of Das Leben der An-
deren, we can see how the politicization of the state’s own self-securitization 
produces initiatives devised to quell any agitating attack from within. With this 
politicization comes a perversion that is especially discernible in the character 
of Wiesler: called upon by his government to preserve the stability of the re-
gime, he becomes a parody of the dispassionate Stoic, no longer driven by the 
ideal of apatheia but rather mired in sheer apathy toward the human.  
Wiesler’s impassiveness, memorably performed by Mühe, plays out in a 
chilling scene early in the film, when he invites a prostitute into his somber, 
austere apartment. In his insightful reading, Gary Schmidt singles out this 
episode as exemplary of the dualism that he regards as operative throughout the 
plot, namely between feminine-coded corporeality and masculine-coded spirit-
uality. Schmidt writes: “The film figuratively aligns the feminine with the state 
of fact (i.e., the material world) and the masculine with the mental/spiritual 
world deemed to transcend the former” (Schmidt 2009, 235). Although, as 
Schmidt brilliantly demonstrates, this tension motivates many of the screen-
play’s characterizations, it fails to acknowledge the fundamental definition of 
the human itself as the conjunction of the body and soul – a conjunction that 
Wiesler must neglect so as to remain impassive to any corporeal or emotional 
impulses that would disturb his mission. In my view, the overriding tension that 
the film presses is rather the opposition between state-oriented security and the 
human-oriented cares that would undermine it. The peripeteia thus consists in 
redirecting Wiesler’s cura, not from the material to the spiritual but rather from 
the life of the state to the lives of other humans.  
The conversion begins as soon as Wiesler learns that Dreyman is being ob-
served not because he is suspected of being a “subversive” but rather because 
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the East German minister of culture is infatuated with and lusts after Sieland, 
who is living in the playwright’s home. The surveillance order, therefore, was 
not issued on the basis of concern for the regime’s security but instead on the 
basis of a wholly personal, sexually charged cura. Hardly a dangerous enemy 
of the state, Dreyman turns out to be an unsuspecting victim of conspiracy. As 
in a Roman tragedy, Dreyman is regarded by the state’s functionaries as an 
obstacle to be overcome, a rival who must be eliminated in order for the 
statesman to secure the object of his lascivious desire. 
The emergence of an all-too-human concern fatally disrupts the routinized 
procedures of the Stasi officer and essentially demechanizes Wiesler, who is 
suddenly and irreversibly recalled to his humanity.7 He slowly but decisively 
becomes emotionally attached to Dreyman and Sieland, fascinated by the cou-
ple’s movements, their conversations, their intimacy. Wiesler’s increasing 
fondness eventually redefines the objective of his security enterprise. No longer 
acting as a political instrument for the state, Wiesler begins to protect the pri-
vate lives of Dreyman and Sieland. He takes the risk to meet Sieland personal-
ly, whose own insecurity has led her to prostitute herself out of fear that she 
would otherwise ruin her acting career, first by sleeping with Bruno Hempf 
(Thomas Thieme), the repulsive Minister of Culture, and later by becoming an 
“unofficial informant” (an Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter, or IM) for the state. Wies-
ler meanwhile is shown to be less and less enthralled to the system that he once 
upheld so vigorously. Posing as a fan, Wiesler suggests to Sieland that her 
talent requires no patron. In appreciation and with a rare moment of sincerity, 
she thanks the stranger and tells him that he is “a good person” (ein guter 
Mensch). Subsequently, back at his listening post, Wiesler is pleased to hear 
her swear to Dreyman that she will no longer keep her sordid appointments 
with Hempf. It is as a human – as a good Mensch – that Wiesler is able to touch 
the lives of others and thereby begin to live himself. 
3.  Humanization 
The state that cares only for itself can never provide security for anyone or for 
anything other than itself. Its security program exclusively removes the con-
cerns that threaten its own legitimacy and power. Consequently, it effectively 
spreads insecurity among the populace. Sieland, too, must secure her own 
career by desecuring others. HGW opts out of this program altogether by be-
coming human, by becoming Gerd Wiesler, who ultimately learns to care for 
                                                             
7  It is precisely this humanization of the Stasi officer that many German critics, mindful of 
the horrors of the East German regime, found especially questionable; and this has been a 
fairly common critique among German scholars working on the film. For a brief overview, 
see Dueck (2008).  
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other humans and thereby provide them with safety. Dreyman, who is known to 
be a devoted communist, believes at first that he has nothing to fear. His own 
disillusionment, which parallels Wiesler’s, occurs during his birthday party 
with friends. This event broaches the uncomfortable issue of blacklisting artists 
and writers. Dreyman’s colleague, the theater director Albert Jerska (Volkmar 
Kleinert), who has suffered dearly from being blacklisted, hands over his birth-
day present to Dreyman: a piano score of an etude entitled “Sonata for the 
Good Man” (Sonate vom Guten Menschen). Wiesler is thereby brought into 
even closer proximity with his surveillance subject, because both have now 
been identified explicitly by the same human quality. Wiesler’s concern for 
Dreyman is therefore in a sense concern for himself. Days later, when Dreyman 
learns that Jerska has hanged himself, his anger and frustration impel him to 
write an article on suicide rates in East Germany, figures that are tightly sup-
pressed by the state, again as a security measure. The plan is to publish the 
piece anonymously in the West German periodical Der Spiegel. Upon being 
baptized as a good man by the distraught Jerska, Dreyman could regard his 
birthday as a rebirth into humanity. At the piano, he plays through Jerska’s 
sonata, a rehearsal for the ode that he will compose on a typewriter’s keyboard 
and present as a memorial to his dead friend. 
To be human is to be mortal, to be prey to contingencies beyond one’s con-
trol. And Dreyman correspondingly takes necessary precautions before setting 
himself to work on the dangerous article. Fully aware that every typewriter in 
East Germany is registered with the state, he will write the piece on a miniature 
model that had been smuggled in from the West and is hidden beneath the 
floorboards. Furthermore, to confirm that his apartment is not bugged, he and 
his friends devise a ruse, pretending to be engaged in a smuggling plot. In other 
words, Dreyman stages a fake conspiracy in order to conspire securely against 
the state that has conspired against him. Wiesler refrains from contacting the 
authorities, which attests to his sympathy as well as convinces Dreyman (false-
ly) that he is not under watch. The playwright can proceed with his subversive 
writing relatively without concern, thanks of course to his unknown but effec-
tive protector. Wiesler is still a security agent, yet now an altogether “good” 
one – one who in fact provides security rather than promulgate insecurity and 
collective paranoia on behalf of a brutally inhuman regime. 
The apathy that ideally characterizes all instruments of mediation is over-
come by increasing passion. Wiesler’s official reports are no longer accurate 
because his cura is now directed far from state matters. The disrupting emer-
gence of strong, impassioned sentiment marks the replacement of political 
calculability by classical aesthetic feeling. Wiesler picks up a volume of 
Brecht’s poetry that he discovers on Dreyman’s desk and closely reads it 
through. The poem that is singled out in the film is Brecht’s well-known lyric 
“Erinnerung an die Marie A.,” which dates from 1920 but was first published 
in the Hauspostille collection of 1927. The camera closes in on Wiesler’s face 
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as he reads the text, yet in voiceover, it is Dreyman who is heard enunciating 
the lines: 
Und fragst du mich, was mit der Liebe sei? 
So sag ich dir: Ich kann mich nicht erinnern. 
Und doch, gewiß, ich weiß schon, was du meinst 
Doch ihr Gesicht, das weiß ich wirklich nimmer 
Ich weiß nur mehr: Ich küsste es dereinst. 
 
And should you ask me, what’s become of love? 
I’ll tell you: I cannot remember. 
And yet, certainly, I do know what you mean 
But her face, I really know no longer 
I only know now: I kissed it once. 
In addition to reinforcing the sympathetic relationship between Dreyman and 
Wiesler, between perpetrator and victim, the poem evokes the themes of transi-
ence, fleeting desire, and failed memory that define the human condition. The 
rapid alternation between knowing and not knowing is reflected in the repeti-
tion of forms of wissen (to know): gewiß, ich weiß schon … das weiß ich wirk-
lich nimmer / Ich weiß nur mehr. The desire for certainty – Gewißheit, a con-
cept closely linked to security – is both motivated and frustrated by the 
erstwhile lover’s concern. Moreover, these lines from Brecht’s “breviary” 
(Hauspostille) decidedly diverge from the conventional image of Brecht as 
someone who is politically engaged, ironic, and cynical. In the utterly private 
scene of Wiesler’s reading, the poetry serves to depoliticize art and is made to 
speak instead to transcendent and universal values, values that would appear to 
contradict the historical materialist vision associated with Brecht.8 To be sure, 
the sympathetic relationship between Dreyman and Wiesler – that is, between a 
type of “actor” and “spectator” – militates against Brecht’s entire concept of 
epic theater, based as it is on breaking the illusion that would foster such identi-
fications. These refunctionalizations of Brecht are fairly evident in the persis-
tent references to “the good person” (der gute Mensch) – in Sieland’s remark to 
Wiesler and in Jerska’s piano etude, Sonate für einen guten Menschen, which at 
the film’s end will serve as the title of Dreyman’s memoir dedicated to agent 
“HGW XX/7.” These clear allusions to Der gute Mensch von Sezuan both 
reinforce and disprove the lesson of Brecht’s parable: on the one hand, as both 
Shen Te and Wiesler come to realize, in order to remain good, one must adopt 
masks and be willing to dissemble in a society that will ultimately abuse moral 
integrity; on the other hand, and contrary to Brecht’s argument, it is only in the 
post-Wende sphere of capitalist liberalism that such goodness can in fact flour-
ish. 
                                                             
8  On this point, see Stein (2008, 575); and Schmidt (2009, 243-4).  
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In Das Leben der Anderen, humanization is consistently linked to a liberal 
view that poses as an apolitical position. Statements from the director corrobo-
rate this claim. In an interview with John Esther, Donnersmarck explains, “I 
really don’t believe there is such a thing as politics. It’s all about individuals. 
[…] So I tried to focus on individual psychology in the film. Rather than tell a 
political story, I show how people make the politics and how that affects peo-
ple.” The director continues by recommending that one should “strike a balance 
between principle and feeling […] between Vladimir Lenin and John Lennon” 
(Esther 2007, 40). Metaphors of balancing commonly surface in discussions of 
public security: One does not have to conjure an entirely Orwellian scenario to 
find how security’s promise to eliminate fear or provide stability may encroach 
upon, compromise, or severely limit human freedom. Indeed, suspicions about 
exchanging liberty for security course through world history and are perhaps 
most popularly expressed in the over-quoted line long attributed to Benjamin 
Franklin: “Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little tem-
porary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.”9 As we might expect, this 
intimation reaches back to classical Roman literature, for example in Livy’s 
account of the early Republic or in Horace’s lyric reflections on the dynamics 
of life within the burgeoning Empire. 
Throughout this long history, the cura about existential threats, which state 
security claims to exercise, is supplanted by a cura about the limitations and 
trade-offs required for the former. In Das Leben der Anderen both species of 
cura characterize the human condition and hence a humanist ideal. Although it 
would be difficult – but not altogether impossible – to interpret Don-
nersmarck’s film within a purely Stoic context, it does appear to be sufficiently 
clear that the concerns exhibited by the story’s individuals (Wiesler, Dreyman, 
Sieland, among others) are designated by the passions or pathē that character-
ize what the filmmaker regards to be human. In the interview cited above, it is 
the impassioned music of John Lennon (perhaps as well as his deeply personal 
forays into political activism) that represents the basic, universal human feel-
ings that must be summoned to balance against the rigorous, political program 
of Vladimir Lenin. Donnersmarck seems to regard this struggle between musi-
cal sentiment and ideological tenacity as central to the film’s conception. In 
another interview, he divulges that it was the old story, first related by Maxim 
Gorky, about Lenin’s love for Beethoven’s aptly named Appassionata piano 
sonata that supplied the initial inspiration for the screenplay. According to 
                                                             
9  This sentence first occurs as a quote from a message to the governor from the Pennsylvania 
Assembly in Richard Jackson’s An Historical Review of the Constitution and Government of 
Pennsylvania, which was published in London by Franklin in 1759, p. 289. It was also used as 
the motto for the book’s title page. A later variant, also set in quotation marks, is found 
among Franklin’s notes for an address to the Pennsylvania Assembly in February 1775, pub-
lished in Franklin (1818-19, 1: 517).  
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Gorky, Lenin confessed, “I don’t want to listen to it because it makes me want 
to stroke people’s heads, and I have to smash those heads to bring the revolu-
tion to them.” Donnersmarck adds: “I suddenly had this image in my mind of a 
person sitting in a depressing room with earphones on his head and listening 
into what he supposes is the enemy of the state and the enemy of his ideas, and 
what he is really hearing is beautiful music that touches him” (Riding 2007). 
However, the optimism expressed here is qualified by the fact that at the 
film’s end, the two protagonists, Dreyman and Wiesler, fail to come into per-
sonal contact, even though the Wall has come down, even though the Stasi has 
been dissolved and the files are now a matter of public record. Nonetheless, the 
distance maintained between the two figures can also be regarded as the consti-
tutive gap that is prerequisite for care. After the mechanism of State Security 
has been broken apart, the bonds of humanity are once again reinforced by the 
cura that joins us by keeping us separate. In Germany, the controversy sparked 
by this film essentially turned on the complaint that a Stasi officer was not 
depicted with sufficient cruelty. This presumed failure arguably denied today’s 
audience of a particular pleasure, namely to compare our present society with 
the recent past and thereby conclude that we are not as bad as people back then. 
In contrast, Donnersmarck appears to lodge a serious warning: we better hold 
on to our humanity, lest it disappears entirely into the warm bath of compla-
cency. Conspiracies against the population no less than individuals’ conspira-
cies against them will never accomplish a life that is carefree – which of course 
saves it from never becoming careless.  
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